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Bonnie Harris is referred to herein as "Bonnie."
Issue:

Standard of Review:
Since the facts were not contested the only issue before the trial cor*r* -\*a- one
of lai v" I -egal zoncli isions are rei - lc - .
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authorized by law. That was a conclusion of law. ^wfeui conclusions are reviewed for
correctness. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911914 (Utah 1998).

1

Under Rule 12(f) '%the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial impertinent, or scandalous matter." A Motion to
Strike is also appropriate as to inadmissible evidence. Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498
P.2d 352 (Utah 1972), citing 6 Moore Fed. Pro., at page 2817.

Respondent's

Memorandum before the trial court cited no authority under law. None is known to
apply to this case.
Issue:
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in Bonnie's favor?
Standard for Review:
Granting Bonnie's Motion to Strike constituted Summary Judgment against
Craig. The party against whom the judgment on the pleadings has been summarily
granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising
therefrom, considered in a light most favorable to him. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123
Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953), extensively cited.
Citation to Record Showing Preservation of Issue Presented for Review:
The trial court determined that the Motion to Strike was justified as a matter of
law and then the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment against Appellant.1
RULES^ INTERPRETATION OF WHICH ARE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Rule 12. Defenses and Objections.
* * *

(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings
1

Record, 1397
2

are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all materia' made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56
(f) Motion to Strike, Upon motion made l: a part\ before responding u* a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made h\
a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court ma> order ^ricken
from any pleading any insufficient defense or any rcdundar i. immaterial, impertinent. «>r
scandalous matter.
* * *

Rule 56. Summary Judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, -n ^;v>sclaim or to obtain a declaratt >ry judgment may, at any time after the expiration. o\ 20 ca> s
from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment
by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in h?< r r\ >r -ipon :»!1 or any part thereof.
,u

* Fnr J< u ting party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summarv i"<!<;ment in his favor as to all or any part thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings inereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall
be filed and served in accordance with CIA 4-501. ihe judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law \
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. !f on motion, under this rule judgment is
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before
it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist
without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to 'which the amount of damages or other
relic: ^ not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
j i 1 :pon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall he conducted accordingly,
•v.M h a r m of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
v. ,>uUl be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
•t-^/i v t 0 testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers

i

or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.
* * *

STATEMENT OF CASE
Through supplemental motion and affidavits captioned Memorandum in Support
of Motion Re: Order to Show Cause and Other Related Matters, Craig set out a
documented Statement of Facts as to how Bonnie obtained $67,897.00 in excess of that
granted to her by the trial court in its Decree.
Bonnie filed no Objection, taking no exception to Craig's "Statement of Facts."
Instead, Bonnie filed a Motion to Strike, challenging the caption of the document and
procedure.
Disregarding Craig's motion and supporting documents, the trial court granted
Summary Judgment in Bonnie's favor by granting her Motion to Strike.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This is a second marriage for both parties. No children were bom of this

marriage and none were ever expected.2 The parties separated in 1995 some time before
this action was commenced.

Marital property constitutes approximately a million

dollars.

2
3

Record, 13, Admitted in Answer, paragraph 3.
Record, 1-3
4

2.

The trial court set January 26, 1999 as the valuation/distribution date of

marital property.4

The CPA firm of Norman/Loebbecke, requested by Bonnie and

stipulated by Craig, was appointed to assist the court.3
3.

On December

28, 1999, Craig filed a Rule

59/60 Motion

for

Reconsideration, with the trial court, seeking clarification as to division of certain
property, adding that,6
Since the trial the Respondent [Bonnie] has so interpreted the Decree,
maneuvered the transfer of property, and failed to comply with
requirements of the Court imposed upon herself so as to unlawfully
transfer to herself a much greater cash dollar value than directed by the
Court at trial.
4.

On December 29, 1999, Bonnie filed a Notice of Appeal1 as Case Number

2000003 7-C A before this Court. That matter is still pending appeal but does not include
the supplemental proceedings that are the subject hereof.
5.

Through supplemental proceedings before the trial court, on December 19,

2000,8 Craig filed his Motion Re: Order to Show Cause and Other Related Matters,
claiming that Bonnie had unlawfully transferred to herself a much greater cash dollar
value and property than directed by the trial court under its Decree.
6.

Attached to that Motion, Craig included a detailed Accounting, Affidavits

and Exhibits that comprised 147 pages. Craig's Motion and Accounting to the trial

4

Record, 1330
Record, 1401
6
Record, p 655, paragraph 9.
7
Record, 665.
8
Record, 1096-1244.
5

court is included in the Addendum.9 A full copy of that Memorandum included in the
Addendum, including all allegations, facts and wording contained therein, is
incorporated herein by reference and made a part hereof.
7.

As set forth in Craig's Motion, Bonnie maneuvered the financial accounts,

delayed the matter and reported that a warehouse had been burglarized. That claim was
false. Evidence set forth in the Addendum reflect that:
a. Bonnie had sole possession to a large secondary business/family storage
warehouse located near the marital home;
b. At one time Bonnie reported to the Pleasant Grove Police Department that
the warehouse had been burglarized by forced outside entry through one
of the overhead garage doors; and
c. From personal examination at the warehouse — evidence, photographs,
affidavit and descriptions taken by the Chief Engineer from thai overhead
garage door manufacturing company, it was determined that Bonnie's
allegation of forced outside entry, burglary and theft by unknown persons
was false:10
Photographs were taken of both the inside and outside of the
door. Of particular interest was the examination of the hole that
remained in the doorjamb from which the bottom lag screw had
been removed.
It is my opinion, based upon experience in testing forces and
observing the results of the force required to remove such lag
screws, that the lag screw in question had not been forcibly
9

Record, 1097-1244.
Record, 1191-1192.

10

6

removed from the outside. Someone had intentionally unscrewed
the lag screw from the inside. The remaining hole in the doorjamb
was consistent with having been physically unscrewed by some
individual. Close up photographs were taken of the "L" bracket
and remaining hole. Had that lag screw been removed by force
from the outside, the remaining hold would have caused
considerable damage to the wood. The *'L" bracket would have
been deformed and twisted, the track would have been twisted to
some degree and the exterior of the door itself would have been
warped and damaged.
On the exterior of the door were some small marks that appeared
to be abrasions. Close-up photographs were taken of the abrasions
on the outside of the door in the vicinity of the purported breach
and entry. Such marks are not consistent with a forced entry.
My conclusion is that someone manually removed the interior
lag screw with a wrench for the apparent purpose of making it
appear that the door had been breached. Someone did what I
observed with access to the inside of the building by keyed entry.
I observed no evidence of forced entry. The observed "breach" of
the door could have only been done from inside the storage
building [warehouse].
8.

Craig's Motion and Accounting prayed that the trial court grant him

judgement in his favor for the excess values taken by Bonnie.11
9.

Choosing to make no Objection under the provisions of Rule 4-501,

Bonnie just filed a Motion to Strike}2
10.

On February 15, 2001, the trial court entered its written Ruling, giving

Summary Judgment in Bonnie's favor through granting her Motion to Strike.12*
11.

Among other things, the trial court's Ruling held that Craig had no

standing to claim recovery from Bonnie of property that Bonnie took from the

11

Record, 1224.
Record, 1259
13
Record, 1330

12

7

warehouse when such property belonged to Craig's sons or other relatives.

That

February 15, 2001 Ruling stated that,14
Petitioner [Craig] has no standing to claim recovery for items belonging to
relatives. Respondent [Bonnie] is correct in asserting that affected
individuals or business entities would have to file their own [separate
actions and] claims [against Bonnie].
12.

Bonnie's Motion to Strike and her memoranda in support of that Motion

set out no reference to any Case Law, Rules or Statues. The "Statement of Faicts" made
no reference to any portion of the record and was unsupported by affidavit or any
documentation.15
13.

Bonnie filed no Objection to Craig's Motion but opted instead to just file

the Motion to Strike}6
14.

No evidentiary hearing was held. No testimony was presented. Upon the

pleadings on file, the trial court summarily ruled in Bonnie's favor.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Not being supported by reference to any rule or case law, under the provisions
of Rule 12(c), Bonnie's Motion to Strike must be interpreted as a motion for decision on
the pleadings.

Under the provisions of Rule 12(c), a motion for decision on the

pleadings constitutes a Motion for Summary Judgment. Bonnie's Motion set forth no
documented Statement of Facts or reference to the Record.

Record, 1330
Record, 1259 and 1315.
Record, 1259
8

Iii I rail? \ Motion In: had provided the trial court, an. extensive and documented
SlaUTiniif oi I 11 \> tint ><ii|i|)ii Inl \w "! I"' [uu'C"-. nl i:\itliiiic admissible under the
provisions of Rule 56(e).

As a matter of strategy, Bonnie ,L'

Objection to Craig^ motion
I-

*

Rather

he determined . \^

o

a Mou^i. ... Strike.

. randum made making no reference to any documented facts,

rules or case law.
Craig was entitled to Summary Judgment oi1 the pleadings.

Instead, the trial

court granted summary judgment in Bonnie's favor by ordering that the entirety of
< raid's

i d M i nil in i mi ni I

I MI k e n .

: •

This appeal is taken from that Order.
ARGUMENT
Point 1
The order of the trial court is reversible error as it constituted a ruling of
summary judgment against Craig.
A Motion to Strike may be brought under the provisions oi Rule 1 *()l, I \\U nl
in response to "any redundent, immaterial, impertinent, oi scandalouse

matter."

I Itnu'ii " s Motion (o Sliikt' d* i1"--, not (all williiu RuR" l,!ih nor is that Rule is never cited in
any of Bonnie's pleadings.
A Motion to Strike may also be brought against inadmissible evidence, i.e. when
supporting allii

- ^re insufficient under t! le requirements of the I Jtah Rules of

Evidence. An affidavi* -

»i in*i\ mil nif MIO up IN 1 Roniiii m-idi m» nh|a iion to the

sufficiency of any of the documents/evidence that Craig filed as attachments u

Motion. Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352 (Utah 1972), citing 6 Moore Fed.
Pro., at page 2817.
An affidavit that does not measure up to the standards of 56(e) is
subject to a motion to strike; and formal defects are waived in the absence
of such a motion.
But Bonnie made no objection to any of the information contained in any of the
Exhibits that Craig had filed. Nor did Bonnie make reference to any rule, case law or
statute in support her Motion to Strike. Bonnie made no objection to any allegations
that Craig made. Craig's Motion for an Order to Show Cause and Other Related
Matters was brought before the trial court in good faith and all portions of the
"Statement of Facts" were supported as required under the rules. A full copy of Craig's
Motion before the trial court is enclosed in the Addendum to this Brief of Appellant.
It is not necessary to find fault with the nature of either side's form of pleadings.17
It is well settled that in determining whether the trial court properly
characterized a document before it, we look to the substance of that
document, and not merely to its caption. DeBry, 828 P.2d at 522; see
also Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Sonf 808 P. 2d 1061 1064 (Utah
1991) (an incorrect title placed upon a pleading is not a bar to the case);
accord Gallardo, 800 P.2d at 817; Armstrong Rubber Co., 657 P.2d at
1347-48.
However, there is no known, cited or referenced basis upon which Bonnie's
Motion to Strike was made and Bonnie's Memorandum before the trial court made no
reference to any rule, statute, case or authority.
Motions to strike are commonly made under the provisions of Rule 12(f):

17

Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854 P.2d 555 (UT App. 1993).
in

(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
Bonnie's motion made no reference to Rule 12(f).
A motion to Sumc may also br lr.uli1 \\\ v\\ ;ilriilii\,(

'

' 111 • ' Mie

requirements of Rule 56(e), URCivP. Rule 56(e) requires that,
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein.
The reason Bonnie made no Objection to Craig s factual allegations is that
Craig's Memorandum, and Exhibits made extensive reference to the record, rules and
case law. I r.n*j • Mimu *u\\ " dnl 1 1 1 il < 1 I

1 1 I ,i M J U K

IL , "ilc • nf

judicial administration and included admissible evidence and exhibits required lor ,u ii
motions. Bonnie selected not to challenge or contest any of Craig's Statement of Facts.
I Ii idei th 2 circi 11: nstances of tl le case Ci aig w as entitled to summary judgment in his
favor on his Motion. Craig's Motion and Memorandum mil .ill ml flu- ra|iiircnunl
Rule 56(e).
Ktile MiUi, I "1*!< Vi I , intrudes I hat,
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed h\ depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion r summary
11

,»f

judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him.
But Bonnie made no objection under Rule 56(e) or any other specified rule.
Bonnie's claim in her Memorandum is that her Motion to Strike is appropriate
because,18
The petitioner [Craig] and his attorney have never had an order to
show cause issued with respect to their Motion.
It is true that Craig did not meet all of Bonnie's demands for transfer of all
property without question. For that the trial court entered an order of contempt, giving
Craig ten (10) days to comply.19 That contempt was immediately purged and no penalty
was ever imposed.
Under the rules, circumstances and pleadings, there was no possible way for
Craig to anticipate that the trial court would not require Bonnie to answer to the charges
made against her as extensively set forth in his Motion for Order to Show Cause. How
could Craig even anticipate that there was any basis for a motion to strike when there
was not? Bonnie's Motion to Strike makes no reference at all to Rule 56(e).
There were large pieces of equipment in the warehouse that required heavy
moving equipment. Bonnie could not have cleaned out the warehouse without help.

18
19

Record, 1252, Bonnie's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, page 8.
Record, 1257, reference from Bonnie's Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Strike, page 3,
paragraph 6.

n

^

-

:

- . ' . ) , vc i .a

burglarized? B o n n i e \ . ,** •

^-? warehouse had. been

,

;;jre is " o

basis upon which the trial court may support Bonnie's lies. But it did. I h e i.v :\ •

>f

the trial court far exceeded any discretion.
Since no authority is known or cited in her Motion or Memorandum
of her Motion

/< > •

in

Support

Bonnie N motion must fall under the provisions of case law and

Rule 12(c) of the uian Rules of Civ il Procedi ire

Boi inie's Moth v i t : > St

interpreted as a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

;

ke • i i n ist be

brought before the court under

Ilk pi i \ iMons i I k u k I J k I. 1 l<( 'i\ P., as a "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings/'
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings.
After the pleadings are
closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move
for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to
such a motion by Rule 56.
There is no other way to interpret Bonnies Motion to Strike except as a motion
as )tidiiinni( on \\w \Aw\\\\\\)is
Making a calculated decision to file no Objection i, \crv \\\i\

"' "' I

i »

Objection n iiied as required under Rule 4-501, judgment may be entered in Craig's
r n l n i h i n l -trategy decision to only file a Motion to Strike.

But

there is no basis given for any motion lo s l n l r ;iml nun, \ w\\ h Innn.l in * ,t;,i liv. .,i n,,
the rules. Bonnie has cited nothing in support of her motion that Craig's Accounting
ai id prayer for relief and any request of Craig for judgment must be stricken.
IT

Craig's Motion is supported by extensive reference to the Record, Affidavits and
Exhibits. The substance of Bonnie's Motion to Strike must be interpreted as a Motion
for Summary Judgment.
Craig's Motion met all of the requirements of Rule 4-501(2) "Motions for
Summary Judgment."

Under Rule 4-501(2)(B) "Memorandum

in Opposition

to

Summary Judgment''
All material facts set forth in the movant's statement [Craig's Statement of Facts]
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing
party's statement [of facts].
There is no question that under that standard the actions of the trial court taken
against Craig must be reversed and remanded. Bonnie chose not to make any objection
to any of Craig's Statement of Facts.
Craig met all requirements of Rule 4-501 (2)(A) by first setting out a fully
documented and complete "Statement of Facts." Once Bonnie decided to not meet the
requirements of Rule 4-501, Craig was entitled to "Judgment on the Pleadings" in his
favor.
Point 2
The trial court committed reversible error when it Ruled that a divorce
court had no authority to resolve disputes over property of others that
had been taken by Bonnie from the warehouse.
The domestic case of D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P. 2d 345 (UT App. 1992) is
controlling. D'Aston dealt with the taking of property that belonged to others.

14

] In* IVliiiojiji, Biiiiin 1 > A .ion was a coin dealer. Pending the divorce. Dorothy
D'Aston and her son I-r\c k II \si. w• Ii.nl i.ikui u»m Itial \wre being held by Bruno on
consignment.
Eryck B. Aston appeals from an order and decree entered by the trial
court awarding appellee, Bruno Df Aston, certain personal property seized
from Eryck pursuant to a Writ of Execution aiid Assistance. On appeal,
Eryck seeks an order quashing the writ, vacating the trial court's order and
decree issued pursuant to the writ, and directing that all property sewed
from Eryck be redelivered to him. Eryck also claims the trial court
erroneously awarded Bruno attorney fees as an item of costs. Bruno
cross-appeals contending the appeal is moot, a contention we summarily
reject. Except for the cost issue, we affirm.
In May of 1986, Bruno D'Aston tiled a complaint against his wife and
children seeking (1)
,*i\. i ui Li* wife, Dorothy D'Aston, (2)
distribution of marital property between Bruno and Dorothy, and (3) a
determination of the rights of his two adult children, Eryck and Lisa, to
certain property. In the complaint, Bruno alleged that Eryck, in collusion
with Dorothy, had stolen coins and other property from his car and motor
home on April 30, 1986. Bruno claimed many of the allegedly stolen coins
and silver bullion described in his complaint were in his possession by
consignment
from
individuals, Michael Graham and Al Schaefer.
Accordingly, he sought an order compelling Dorothy and the children to
return the allegedly stolen property. (Note 1)
%$ *

Pursuant to the decree, Bruno was awarded a 70% ownership interest
in the allegedly stolen coins and other property, and Dorothy was
awarded the remaining 30%. Bruno was also awarded possession of the
coins he claimed to have held on consignment. The decree stated that if
any of the coins and other property alleged u ha\e been KMCII n = »ir
Bruno were found in possession of am o r I]K parties
*, aeiu ;
would be considered contempt of court
Note I: Shortly a tic; Bruno reported the coins and other property
stolen, he prepared for the police, from memory, a detailed list
of many of the items missing. Included among this property
were various coins, bullion and other personalty, such as
camera lenses, carrying cases and other optical equipment.

Through the trial court's February 15, 2001 Ruling and subsequent Order, it
refused to consider any evidence of Bonnie's wrongdoing.
Craig's accounting and Motion established that Bonnie had falsely reported to
the Police Department that the warehouse had been burglarized. Pending the divorce,
the warehouse contained property that belonged to Craig, AID Equipment Co., Craig's
sons, his mother and other relatives.
At one hearing, Bonnie, speaking of her need to maintain the yard., asked for
some hand tools (shovels and such things) that were in the warehouse. Consequently,
under a Stipulation on the Record, 20 it was agreed that Bonnie would have time to take
some "personal tools." Bonnie was to remove those tools before a certain date. After
that date, Craig was entitled to take all other property in the warehouse.
Bonnie then stripped the entire warehouse of all items of any value except a large
heavy steal gun vault. (See Addendum for photographs and details.) There was a lot
of property in that warehouse.
In Craig's Motion, he asked the trial court to order the return of items he owned
and items that belonged to others.
To that request, the trial court responded by issuing its Order to Strike Craig's
Motion. In that action alone, the trial court granted Bonnie the benefit of her theft and
wrongdoing, awarding her an additional amount of property valued at more than Sixty
Thousand Dollars ($60,000.00) in addition to that granted in the Supplementary Decree
of Divorce.

1*

V' * '

i.-uia c\plaiii and no explanation was given in the

formal Order.
The trial court's Ordei jn

Petitioner's Motion Re. * ^

Other Matters and Respondent's Motion to Strike Motion Re: Order to Show Cause and
Other Matter^ 1 |usi ^impk suicd,
The Court having heard and considered the oral arguments of the
parties, having read and considered the memoranda and exhibits filed by
the parties, having reviewed the tile in this matter and now being fully
advised in the premises, hereby orders, adjudges and decrees as follows:
1. The Respondent's Motion to Strike is granted as to all matters
except for the Personal Property from the shed
2. The Petitioner's Order to Show Cause is denied with respect to the
Petitioner's claims to the personal property, all other claims having been
stricken.
3. Attorney fees are denied.
CONCLUSION
Bonnie's deception and uhiu' H propers
Carig's Statement of Facts.

was cxtensi\el\ documented in

Since Bonnie made no objectio

Judgment in his favor as prayed.

The trial

a-.

,
Ruling and Ordei mtu

granted Bonnie"i Mo'ion n> ^»r«t *: PI»M hv sci a^ide ai id summary judgment entered b>
the trial court in Craig's favor as prayed in his Motion.
RFT IFF SOUGHT
Craig pvA\^ ihni i\ i • ( i I nourse and remand this matter, directing the trial
coi ill :_ enter summan Judgment

. »on and

Memorandum as follows:
Record, 1239, in Addendum, and Transcript of Hearing, Record, 1163, page 5, lines 1-1 -;
17

A.

$23,000.00 for items "missing" from the storage building;

B.

$4,600.00 for Craig's personal property taken from the storage building;

C.

$2,925.00 for AID Equipment property taken from the storage building;

D.

$3,734.00 for Dick Harris' property taken from the storage building;

E.

$8,600.00 for Troy and Scott Harris' property taken from the storage

building;
F.

$4,958.00 for overage taken from Craig's MONY life account;

G.

$3,787.61 excess interest assessed from January 26, 1999;

H.

Since the total amount set forth above constitutes a value of $67,897.00

actual loss, Craig prays that a penalty of an additional amount of $67,897.00, double the
amount unlawfully taken, be awarded to Craig for a total of $135,794.00 plus interest and
that such judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and
attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall
be established by affidavit; plus
I.

Return of such attorney fees and costs previously awarded to Bonnie and

award of attorney fees and costs to Craig as the Court may determine; and
J.

Such additional and further relief as the Court may deem just.
ADDENDUM

1.

Record, 1244 — Craig's Memorandum in Support of Motion Re: Order to
Show Cause and Other Related Matters;

21

Record, 1396-1397.
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2.

I

.:.!...

Memorandum in ^-.pport of Motion I.-* Strike

Motion R e » '• '•

^s:

3.

Record, 1266 — Craig's Objection to Bonnie's Mot

4.

Record, 1315

v

l

i;

Bonnie's Memorandum in Opposition to "Petitioner's

l >h|i n in mi I I I I i Iii Strike Motion Re Older to Show Cause and Other
Matters;
5

Record, 1330 — Ruling; and
Record,

Order on "Petitioner's Motion Re: Order to Show Cause

and Other Matters .in 1 lie'ip.Hidenl

l\l lion ! \ Strike Motion Re: Order

to Show Cause and Other Matters.
DATED: this rQJ

dm OHVLUJL ,!()(),!.

.or^h D. Martin
Attorney at Law
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